Michael Williams (philosopher)
Michael Williams (born 1947) is a contemporary American philosopher best known for his work in epistemology, particularly on skepticism, contextualism, and the nature of epistemic justification. He is currently the Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University.
Williams's primary contributions lie in developing a "deflationary" or "therapeutic" approach to epistemology, arguing that many traditional problems and paradoxes arise from an overly idealized and foundationalist conception of knowledge. He challenges the idea that there is a single, unified project of epistemology and instead emphasizes the importance of understanding knowledge claims within their specific contexts of use.
His early work focused on the problem of skepticism, arguing that skeptical challenges are not inherent features of knowledge itself, but rather arise from specific philosophical contexts and frameworks. He developed a contextualist theory of knowledge, arguing that the standards for justification vary depending on the context in which a knowledge claim is made. This allows him to argue that skepticism is not a pervasive threat to our everyday knowledge.
Later work has been concerned with the nature of justification itself. Williams has been critical of traditional foundationalist and coherentist accounts of justification, arguing that they are based on a misunderstanding of the role of justification in our lives. He proposes an alternative, anti-foundationalist account of justification, emphasizing the importance of "default entitlements" and the role of background beliefs in shaping our epistemic practices. He sees knowledge not as something built upon secure foundations, but as a constantly evolving and negotiated product of social interaction.
Williams's work has been influential in contemporary epistemology, particularly in the development of contextualism and anti-foundationalism. His books include Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology (1977, 1986, 1999), Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism (1991), Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology (2001), and Knowledge and its Limits (2009, edited with Timothy Williamson). His work is often cited and discussed in connection with the work of philosophers like Wittgenstein, Quine, and Rorty.