Pantelism

Pantelism is a philosophical concept, primarily discussed within the context of panpsychism and related theories of mind. It proposes that all matter, not just animate or biologically complex matter, possesses some form of conscious experience, however rudimentary. This differs from panpsychism in its emphasis on the ubiquity of consciousness; rather than positing that some fundamental particles or specific arrangements of matter possess consciousness, pantelism suggests everything experiences something, however minimal and unlike human awareness it might be.

Pantelism doesn't necessarily equate the consciousness of a rock to that of a human being. The "consciousness" ascribed to inanimate objects is typically seen as a basic, proto-experiential state. The complexity of experience is thought to correlate with the complexity of the physical system.

The term "pantelism" is relatively rare compared to "panpsychism," and the distinction between the two is not always sharply defined in philosophical literature. Some consider pantelism a radical form of panpsychism, while others view it as a distinct position with its own unique implications.

Arguments in favor of pantelism often stem from the hard problem of consciousness: the difficulty in explaining how physical processes give rise to subjective experience. Proponents suggest that attributing some form of experience to all matter avoids the need to explain how consciousness suddenly emerges from non-conscious matter. Instead, consciousness is seen as a fundamental property of reality, present in varying degrees across the universe.

Criticisms of pantelism include concerns about the coherence and intelligibility of attributing consciousness to inanimate objects. Skeptics question what it could possibly mean for a rock or a proton to "experience" anything. Additionally, the combination problem poses a challenge: if all matter is conscious, how do the individual experiences of countless particles combine to form the unified consciousness of a larger organism? This problem remains a significant hurdle for pantelistic theories.