David Christensen (philosopher)
David Christensen is an American philosopher known for his work in epistemology, particularly on topics such as disagreement, rational requirements, and higher-order evidence. He is currently a Professor of Philosophy at Brown University.
Christensen's research focuses on the epistemic significance of disagreement. He explores the question of how one should revise one's beliefs when faced with disagreement from epistemic peers – individuals who are equally intelligent, informed, and rational. His work challenges the traditional view that individuals are typically justified in sticking to their initial beliefs in the face of disagreement. Instead, he often argues for a more conciliatory approach, suggesting that disagreement can be a reason to revise one's beliefs, even when the disagreeing party is considered an epistemic peer.
His publications include influential papers on the epistemology of disagreement, rational reflection, and the role of evidence in belief formation. His work is characterized by rigorous argumentation and a careful consideration of the complexities of epistemic reasoning. He has contributed significantly to contemporary debates about rational belief revision and the nature of epistemic justification.
Key areas of Christensen's research include:
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Epistemology of Disagreement: Investigating the rational response to disagreement, particularly from epistemic peers. This includes exploring different views, such as the equal weight view and steadfast views, and their implications for belief revision.
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Higher-Order Evidence: Examining how evidence about the reliability of one's own cognitive processes (higher-order evidence) should influence one's beliefs.
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Rational Requirements: Analyzing the constraints that rationality places on belief and action.
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Skepticism: Addressing skeptical challenges to knowledge and justification.
Christensen's work has been widely discussed and debated in the philosophical community and is considered essential reading for anyone interested in contemporary epistemology.