The Second Chōshū expedition (Japanese: 第二次長州征伐, Dainiji Chōshū Seihatsu), also known as the Second Chōshū Punitive Expedition, was a military campaign launched by the Tokugawa shogunate in 1866 against the Chōshū Domain (Mōri clan) during the late Tokugawa (Bakumatsu) period. It followed the First Chōshū expedition of 1864 and was part of the shogunate’s effort to suppress anti‑shogunate activity and enforce national seclusion policies.
Background
During the early 1860s, Chōshū Domain pursued a policy of sonnō jōi (“revere the Emperor, expel the barbarians”) and increasingly challenged the authority of the Tokugawa shogunate. After the failed First Chōshū expedition, Chōshū continued to support opposition movements and refused to pay tribute, prompting the shogunate to plan a second, larger punitive operation.
Forces
- Shogunate side: Approximately 70,000‑80,000 troops were mobilized from various domains loyal to the shogunate, including forces from Satsuma, Tosa, and Kumamoto. Commanders included senior bakufu officials such as Tokugawa Yoshinobu and Katsu Kaishū.
- Chōshū side: Estimates place Chōshū’s defensive forces at 15,000‑20,000 men, comprising samurai, militia, and newly formed irregular units. Chōshū had begun modernizing its armament with Western firearms.
Course of the campaign
- June 1866: Shogunate forces assembled at strategic points along the Sanyō corridor and began advancing toward Chōshū’s capital, Hagi.
- Logistical challenges: Supply lines proved difficult to maintain across the mountainous terrain, and many shogunate troops were poorly equipped relative to Chōshū’s modernized units.
- Defections: Several domains, notably Satsuma and Tosa, began offering tacit support to Chōshū, leading to desertions and reduced morale among shogunate soldiers.
- Stalemate: By August 1866, the shogunate’s advance stalled; Chōshū employed defensive positions and guerrilla tactics that prevented a decisive breakthrough.
Outcome
In September 1866, the shogunate ordered a withdrawal, ending the expedition without achieving its objective of subjugating Chōshū. The campaign’s failure underscored the weakening authority of the Tokugawa regime and highlighted the growing strength of domains that were sympathetic to imperial restoration.
Significance
- Demonstrated the declining effectiveness of the shogunate’s traditional military structures.
- Accelerated political realignments that culminated in the Boshin War (1868‑1869) and the Meiji Restoration.
- Reinforced Chōshū’s reputation as a leading force in the movement to overthrow the Tokugawa government.
References
- Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan. Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Totman, Conrad. The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1862–1868. University of Hawaii Press, 1980.
- Sims, Richard. Japanese Political History Since the Meiji Restoration. Routledge, 2020.
Note: All information presented reflects established historical consensus as of the latest scholarly publications.
